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Bulk Collection, Intrusion and Domination 
Tom Sorell 
 
Policing regularly involves surveillance. Informants pass on criminal plans to the 
authorities, and then it can be a matter for the police of watching and waiting near the 
place where the offence is supposed to be committed. Perhaps the suspects themselves 
will be watched and followed.  Perhaps listening devices will be placed in their cars. 
These measures are not equally intrusive. Watching in public places is less of a 
violation of privacy than looking through the windows of homes, especially where the 
homes contain non-suspects in addition to suspects. Following is more intrusive than 
stationary observation at the scene of a supposed bank robbery or burglary. 
Unconcealed watching in public spaces is more easily justified than unpublicized 
watching, and so on.  
What about technology-assisted surveillance? This is widespread and probably  
more common now in the developed world than surveillance conducted entirely by 
people. There is an extensive range of surveillance technologies, and differences 
between them can matter morally. Some technologies are more questionable than 
others, because they can intrude into the kinds of spaces that by convention are the 
most private. What is more, they can intrude into these spaces without the knowledge 
of the targets of surveillance. Other technologies are less intrusive but collect huge 
quantities of information very quickly. Sometimes the quantities can be 
disproportionately large.  Again, over time, the information can be analysed for 
purposes quite different from those for which it was originally gathered, and some of 
these purposes are less easy to endorse morally than others. 
For example, Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) can keep track of 
vehicles that are known to be uninsured or stolen or to be travelling in a zone 
attracting special financial charges, but it can also track the movements of particular 
people not suspected of any crime who are simply of interest personally to the 
operator of an ANPR camera or an analyst of ANPR data-bases. ANPR can also assist 
in terrorist investigations, although counterterrorism is probably not among the uses 
first envisaged for ANPR. 
 2 
In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed the up to then secret use by the National 
Security Agency in the US of an intelligence-gathering program which incorporated 
several technological capabilities in combination: fiber-optic cable tapping, de-
encryption, cyber attacks, telephone metadata collection, analysis and fusion, as well 
as bugging and tapping applied to the communications systems of governments 
friendly to the US. The system was designed for counterterrorism. Above all, it aimed 
at compiling an archive of communications data so complete that the task of finding a 
needle in a haystack –a previously unknown terrorist communicating with his terrorist 
associates—would at least not be hampered by the incompleteness of the haystack. 
The data came from the communications of US citizens with foreign nationals, and, in 
exceptional cases, from US citizens communicating with other US citizens. The form 
the data took was, roughly, records of connections between different telephone 
numbers at different times. When this data is aggregated, patterns of intensity of 
connection between different telephone numbers –some only indirectly connected—
are revealed. Sometimes this called “contact chaining”. Collection was supposed to 
proceed under warrants authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, but 
sometimes, by the NSA’s own admission, the terms of the warrants were violated. 
NSA collection of telephone data was discontinued at the end of November, 
2015 under the provisions of the USA Freedom Act, but some data already stored by 
the NSA, or by telecoms companies, is in principle still legally accessible by the 
NSA. Similar technology is employed in the UK by General Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), the Signals branch of the UK intelligence services. Bulk 
Collection, as this form of data-gathering is known, is likely to continue in the UK, 
though it has temporarily been derailed by a recent decision of the Investigative 
Powers Tribunal, which has ruled past UK bulk collection to be contrary to the 
Human Rights Act.  
    Bulk collection has been claimed to amount to intrusion on an epic scale, and 
to bring Western democracies down to the moral level of the Stasi state of the former 
East Germany. According to me, this sort of claim is quite incorrect. Bulk collection 
is not particularly intrusive and, as practiced in the US and UK, it is systematically 
and profoundly different from the intelligence collection techniques of the Stasi. The 
fact that it is relatively unintrusive, however, does not mean that there is nothing 
wrong with it. There is something wrong with bulk collection: namely, the difficulty 
of overseeing it in liberal democracies that allow a great deal of intelligence work –
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perhaps too much--to be done in secret.  Bulk collection also carries the usual risks 
associated with the encapsulation of risk profiles in algorithms: these are the moral 
risks of error and discrimination and the operational risk of information-overload.  
The rest of the discussion is divided into five sections. In the first, 
technologies for targeted surveillance will be reviewed, along with the risks of 
unjustified intrusion they carry. I shall address the question why intrusion is normally 
morally wrong. This will involve me in discussing the value of privacy and the 
different zones protected by established informal conventions about privacy. Privacy 
in the relevant sense is associated with access to information rather than control of 
information. On the basis of the distinction between access and control, I give reasons 
in the second section for thinking that bulk collection is not as intrusive as better 
established technologies used for targeted surveillance. Section 3 distinguishes the 
NSA and bulk collection from the Stasi and its methods of intelligence collection, and 
rejects the claim that the two are relevantly similar. In section 4, I introduce a concept 
from republican theory –that of domination—to articulate a sound line of objection 
against bulk collection: namely that it contributes to “domination” on a modest scale, 
that is, a potential for infringing some citizens’ negative liberty, if it is not, as it is not, 
effectively regulated and overseen.  I end by suggesting that the main problem with 
bulk collection is that too much information surrounding it is classified, wrongly 
impeding the scrutiny of even security-cleared, democratically elected legislators.  
 
Conventional technology for targeted surveillance and zones of privacy 
 
Targeted surveillance in many jurisdictions is assisted by the following, far-from-new 
technology: bugging, telephone wiretapping, CCTV cameras, hidden cameras, and 
ANPR. Bugs are devices for listening undetected to conversations in private rooms or 
vehicles. Telephone tapping technology allows for listening to, and recording, 
conversations on landlines installed in private residences and businesses. CCTV 
cameras are often mounted in outdoor locations and record or transmit or record and 
transmit images of people and vehicles in their relatively near vicinity. CCTV 
cameras can be disguised and secretly operated, or can have their presence advertised 
in prominent public notices close to where they are taking pictures. ANPR operates in 
conjunction with cameras trained on car number plates. These, too, can operate 
openly or secretly, depending on the purpose of use. 
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 Not all of these devices assist targeted surveillance: CCTV and ANPR often 
do not. But where they do, and are used as part of a police investigation or a piece of 
preventive policing in a liberal democracy, they commonly require official legal 
authorization. The need for authorization reflects the fact that targeted surveillance is 
intrusive and that citizens of liberal democracies normally have a right to privacy. A 
right to privacy is normally legally overridden when citizens are suspected of being 
involved in planning or carrying out a serious crime. A serious crime is an unlawful 
act that is intended to cause serious harm.1 
In order to understand why surveillance, including technology-assisted 
surveillance, needs to meet a threshold of justification, we need to ask what is 
normally wrong with surveillance. Surveillance is objectionable where there is 
significant value in being unobserved. Being unobserved has value where observation 
is inhibiting, where it interferes with intimacy, or where it enables someone else to 
share one’s experiences or get personal information about one for no good reason and 
without one’s consent. Secret surveillance is worse than open surveillance because it 
opens the target of surveillance to unwitting, possibly humiliating, or otherwise 
damaging, self-exposure.  
Open surveillance assists protective counter-measures and can in principle 
deter the commission of offences. Secret surveillance in conventionally very private 
places, such as bedrooms or toilets, lies at the extreme of impermissibility. For one 
thing, it is hard to think of any legitimate interest that the public or anyone individual 
has in overhearing or witnessing, still less recording, nudity, sex or defecation. 
 To explain the degrees of intrusiveness of surveillance, and therefore the 
different thresholds of justification that have to be reached to outweigh intrusiveness, 
it helps to distinguish between different zones conventionally protected from 
uninvited observation or from uninvited reporting. In previous work both of my own,2  
and jointly authored with John Guelke,3 I have identified three such zones: the body, 
the mind and the home.  
 By ‘the body’ is meant primarily the exposed or naked human body. 
Conventions for covering the body and for not uncovering the body are also 
conventions against surveillance of the body. Voluntary exposure is an intimate act 
while surveillance, in particular secret surveillance, undercuts intimacy. Involuntary 
or unwitting exposure takes away control of the boundaries one sets even for 
intimates. Involuntary exposure not only seems to contribute to sexual vulnerability, 
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but gives away the presence of disease, disability, injury or mutilation that can put 
one under the power of an attacker, or that can occasion unjustified distaste or 
revulsion. Privacy conventions put the control of self-exposure in the hands of the self 
and limit the unwanted social effects of observation or reporting that prompt 
ostracizing revulsion or distaste.4 
The home, for the purposes of this paper, is the default location occupied daily 
by a person when not otherwise active. It is the zone where people rest and sleep and 
expect to be safe when engaged in either. It is the zone to which someone returns at 
the end of their day or from which they set out to conduct their active life. The home 
in this preferred sense need not be made of bricks and mortar. Even the “homeless” 
can have a default location they return to and which they feel is familiar and relatively 
safe, say an urban doorway where they keep a sleeping bag. Again, someone whose 
life is divided between a flat and the office for roughly equal amounts of time might 
have two places with a claim to count as home. There can be temporary default 
locations, like hotel rooms or passenger aircraft or cars, and the conventions for not 
entering or inspecting the home uninvited can apply to the hotel room or one’s airline 
seat.  
 The home is by convention the default location not only of individuals but 
couples and families, with further conventions governing which rooms are shared and 
when by different individuals. A home in the form of a house may have semi-public 
and altogether private rooms, connected with the exposure of the body in those rooms 
or with the forms that intimacy take. 
 The third and most important zone of privacy is the mind, understood as the 
set of capacities for arriving at what to believe and what to do. The mind is not, for 
our purposes, private in the sense –famously called into question by Wittgenstein--of 
being accessible only to the subject, or being the place where “what it is like” to 
experience something registers. It is normatively private, meaning that it is wrong to 
force people to disclose their thoughts or convictions or to think aloud in some 
substantial sense.5 Especially in contexts where there is some strongly enforced 
political or religious orthodoxy, and expectations that each person will publicly 
proclaim adherence, the freedom to make one’s own mind up privately –without 
thinking aloud and without declaring one’s possibly unorthodox conclusions—comes 
into its own.  
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More generally, the mind is the arena where, by arriving at reasons for beliefs, 
or beliefs on the basis of reasoning, one makes those beliefs one’s own. In the absence 
of the normative privacy of the mind people are likely to be mouthpieces for the 
views of their parents, religious or political leaders, or their class. The normatively 
private mind is also in some sense the pre-eminent zone of privacy, because it is by 
using its capacities that an adult in a liberal democratic society can determine the 
limits of exposure of the body and public access to the home. Normative mental 
privacy, in short, helps with the governance of other normatively private zones, but 
not the other way round. 
If privacy is what one enjoys when experiential and informational access by 
others to one’s body, home, beliefs and choices is significantly limited, then it is easy 
to see that privacy facilitates the exercise of autonomy. The normative privacy of the 
mind helps one to think and choose for oneself, but the public conventions licensing 
limited access to the home also facilitate the exercise of the capacity to choose and to 
believe for reasons.  It is at home that one can be oneself and expose oneself most 
easily, and the home space therefore provides opportunities for trying on different 
views with one’s friends and family before expressing them publicly.  
 The three zones of privacy help to define one’s private life, but do not do so 
completely. What one does privately is not only what one does in private zones, but 
also, in liberal societies at least, what one does outside one’s public roles of citizen, 
employee and so on, in one’s own time. Private life in this sense can include travel at 
one’s own expense, anything done to maintain or extend one’s friendships, and, of 
course, romantic and family life. 
 
How bulk collection is different 
 
Against the background of the value of privacy, it is not hard to see why intrusion 
through targeted surveillance needs a justification. Watching someone for long 
periods, or eavesdropping, even when it is done openly, is a way of penetrating a zone 
or practice of private life without permission. It not only provides knowledge of what 
someone’s habits and preferences are –what he is like—but also information helpful 
to a programme of influence or control, official or otherwise. For example, stalking 
often involves surveillance with a view to control, but stalkers do not include the state 
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or institutions at all, and they sometimes are much more successful in preoccupying 
the mind with anxiety and disabling choice, than state surveillance.6 
Secret surveillance, especially were technology assists penetration of the 
target’s home and exposure of the body, is particularly violating, because it is most 
likely to open someone’s unexpressed thoughts, choices and strong attachments to 
inspection, with the usual safeguards of reticence and deception bypassed. Bugs 
secretly placed in the rooms of a home are particularly intrusive, because of the 
collateral damage of intrusion on untargeted associates or intimates of targets. There 
is no reason for the privacy of these people to be violated, even from the point of view 
of the observer of the targeted person who knows he is guilty of terrible crimes. 
Again, there is no reason to eavesdrop on the family or romantic life even of 
criminals, unless the family or partner is an associate in crime. 
 So much for secret surveillance of the private zones. At the other extreme, 
where surveillance technology operates publicly in public space, say a major road, it 
is still possible to violate privacy. ANPR does not discriminate between the number 
plates of stolen cars being used for a bullion robbery and the number plates of private 
cars lawfully being used for a bit of tourism. In the latter case, lawful activity outside 
a public role –private life—is recorded indiscriminately, in circumstances in which 
the agent has an interest in going about his business relaxed, and therefore 
unscruitinized. Not that we necessarily have here a serious violation of privacy, in the 
sense of unconsented to violation of conventions that define the very sensitive zones, 
but we have an incursion into legitimately private life nonetheless. 
 Bulk collection for the purpose of contact-chaining has some of the 
characteristics of ANPR and some of the characteristics of secret surveillance. Like 
ANPR, it involves matching identifying numbers associated with suspects to other 
data; unlike ANPR, bulk collection has often, in fact almost invariably, taken place 
secretly.  
 
<Figure 1.1 near here> 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the process of intercepting, collecting and storing data from a signal 
or signals (say one or many telephone calls from a number associated with particular 
telephone subscribers, or one or more uses of an internet search engine from a certain 
unique IP address). Meta data (usually identifying the transmitting and sending 
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machines) are extracted, filtered and stored. Authorized queries are then answered by 
searching or analyzing the data and the results disseminated to agents in the 
intelligence services. In some cases the storage of data is time-limited. 
The signals may be derived from splitting an undersea cable carrying digital 
data, or it can be harvested some server or other data receptacle located in the US or 
another country. In some countries telecoms companies hold the relevant data and 
intelligence agents can apply for access to it.  In the US, before the Snowden 
disclosures, the Foreign Intelligence Security Surveillance Act section 215 allowed 
this process to be carried out only on signals from targeted persons, say people who 
on the basis of human intelligence were thought to be members of certain foreign 
extremist organizations or agents of foreign governments.  Special restrictions existed 
on making US persons targets, though if US persons communicated with suspect 
foreign persons even the content of their communications could in principle be legally 
intercepted. 
 The sole, legally recognized, purpose of the NSA’s targeting persons, and 
intercepting, storing and analyzing their communications data before 2015 was 
counterterrorism. How does bulk collection of this kind work? Investigations of 
targets reveal “identifiers” e.g. telephone numbers or email addresses, of people 
whom the targets communicate with. The identifiers disclosed may in turn influence 
the choice of “discriminants” that are used in the collection process. For example, 
suppose that the email address spy@hotmail.com is found in the electronic contact 
book of someone about whom there is a reasonably articulated suspicion (RAS) that 
he is a security threat.  Then a relevant discriminant for a search of stored data may be 
‘all identifiers communicating with spy@hotmail.com.’ A less broad discriminant 
would be ‘all identifiers from Sudan communicating with spy@hotmail.com.’ The 
more general the discriminant, the more the data collected qualifies as “bulk.”  
Beyond that, there is no categorical distinction between bulk and targeted collection. 
An RAS target A may have many identifiers, some unknown to the 
authorities, and may communicate with others, including other RAS targets and 
unknown but dangerous people, through intermediaries. Suppose that A has, among 
other identifiers, the Twitter handle @rasTarget. Then ‘communicates with 
@rasTarget’ would not single out those with whom A communicates by means of 
intermediaries. To cater for these one must see whether there is anyone A 
communicates with, who, repeatedly, soon after receiving A’s messages, 
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communicates with someone else . The relevant discriminants would thus pick up 
patterns of communication one “hop” away from A. NSA bulk collection can legally 
involve searches of communication networks two hops away from A, but before 2015 
this came down from 3 hops. Although there are limits on what intelligence services 
can do with identifiers that are hops away from RAS target identifiers, one can see 
that bulk collection can quickly multiply identifiers of interest well away from anyone 
who is an RAS target. This can make bulk collection look indiscriminate and 
speculative–a “fishing expedition”. 
 Figure 1.2 illustrates the networks of communication contacts that can be 
identified, starting from A.  The diagram shows that A communicates heavily with B, 
that A and B have contact C and other unidentified contacts in common, who are 
therefore prima facie identifiers of interest, and there are several targets in pink 
among B’s network that B may be passing A’s communications to, if B is an 
intermediary. If B is an intermediary, he has a considerable number of contacts not 
shared with A that are only one hop away from A.  Any of these could turn out to be 
an identifier of interest, as could identifiers of receivers of their communications. 
 
<Figure 1.2 near here> 
 
So far we have been considering discriminants tied to an RAS target identifier. But 
bulk collection can be geared to less specific discriminants, e.g. all telephone calls for 
a range of dates between numbers from a certain area code in an American state and a 
certain foreign international calling code, say the code for Syria. Again, bulk 
collection can involve tracking locations of huge numbers of mobile phones. In this 
way, bulk collection can seem to become untethered, or at least risk becoming 
untethered, from definite evidence against particular people of wrongdoing.  
 Again, bulk collection can be used in connection with the detection of the use 
of encryption by certain internet users. If it is assumed that only people up to no good, 
including terrorists, would encrypt their communications, is the investigation of 
identifiers associated with encryption a morally defensible strategy? We will return to 
this question shortly. First, let us ask whether anything has emerged so far to support 
the familiar complaint that bulk collection is intrusive, in fact spectacularly so.  
 It is possible to deny that bulk collection is seriously intrusive without denying 
that it is morally objectionable in other ways, and this is the approach I take. I deny 
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that bulk collection is particularly intrusive, but I do not deny that bulk collection may 
be error-prone, discriminatory, and carried out on a scale that is vastly 
disproportionate to its success in identifying terrorists in the USA. When conducted 
by the NSA, bulk collection was on a gargantuan scale. According to articles in the 
London Guardian and Washington Post, millions of telephone records daily were 
being collected daily in 2013 in the USA, and as many as 25 billion device-location 
records were harvested in April 2012 alone.7 
Given the scale of bulk collection, the results have been meager. Only 64 ISIL 
related arrests were made in 2014-15,8 an unknown proportion of which were based 
on bulk collection, and not all of these led to criminal prosecution.  In the UK, 
evidence given to David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation, suggested that bulk collection was very useful for “target” discovery in a 
sense of “target” including seeds and RAS target. David Anderson was also told that 
bulk collection was the principal UK weapon in the discovery and response to cyber 
attacks.9 
Even if the scale of bulk collection is disproportionate to its proven results in 
counter-terrorism, it may seem undeniable that bulk collection is also intrusive, since 
it is geared to identifiers that are often attached to real people, and identifying the 
people behind email addresses or telephone numbers is intrusive, especially if 
conducted on a big scale and on the identifiers of people with no connection to 
terrorism. After all, it might be said, “even if only meta data is associated with an 
identifier, a telephone record can reveal intense communication between people, 
which, if it were to come to light, could be very embarrassing or damaging without 
revealing the commission of a criminal offence. Meta-data might suggest the 
existence of an affair or some other, so far hidden, piece of behavior, say the use of 
phone sex lines or a gambling obsession that is played out on the internet.  
 These points are reasonable enough, but they suggest inferences that might be 
made by a nosey human investigator in a case where he has met and is curious about 
the suspects. Machine algorithms that identify communications links between 
identifiers differ from the nosey investigator in at least two ways. First they lack 
consciousness, human interests and curiosity, and second, they sift through huge data 
sets at very high speeds to find concealed links between identifiers, the kind that 
might reasonably be expected of terrorists trying to avoid detection by the authorities. 
It is true that intense communication between a terrorist suspect and someone who is 
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only connected to the suspect romantically or commercially might register in the 
output of a search, but unless that contact was a security official or someone 
connected to a likely terrorist target, it might command no more interest than the 
identifier of a popular pizza parlour. 
 Defenders of bulk collection have often tried to counter charges of gross 
intrusion by distinguishing, correctly it seems to me, between meta-data of telephone 
calls and their content, and between collection and inspection of data. It is one thing 
to collect telephone meta-data, including the dates, times and duration of telephone 
calls, and quite another thing to listen to telephone conversations or recordings of 
telephone conversations. Listening is certainly intrusive, even if the wrong of 
intrusion is outweighed by the ability to prevent mass murder when the conversation 
reveals plans for an imminent large-scale attack. But merely collecting records of 
telephone contacts is not necessarily intrusive, and if intrusive at all, it may be only 
mildly so.  
One reason why this claim is sometimes resisted is because two different 
theories of privacy are used, respectively, by defenders and critics of bulk collection. 
According to one theory, keeping one’s data private is a matter of being in control of 
that data. According to the other theory, data is private until its content actually comes 
to someone else’s attention, no matter whether it is under the control of the data 
subject or data producer. Imagine some personal letters forever buried by an 
earthquake, but still legible if unearthed. The writer of the letters does not know 
where they are. They are out of his control. But tons of rock keep them from being 
read. Must there be a loss of privacy if the writer has lost the letters and it is in 
principle possible for the letters to be unearthed? I do not think we are forced to 
answer ‘Yes’.  It depends on whether the letters are read or are likely to be read. In 
the earthquake case, the probability of being unearthed and read is vanishingly small.  
 Specific documents in the secret archives of the intelligence services or an 
hour’s telephone data on the servers of a telecoms company are not necessarily more 
likely to come to the attention of someone who can understand their significance than 
the letters under the earthquake rubble. This fact may be underlined by the enormous 
amount of telephone and other data already collected, the number of queries that are 
daily being processed, and the high probability of information overload where 
intelligence collection and analysis meets operational decision-making. Even if 
information of interest is isolated by collection and analysis, it may not come to the 
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attention of people who recognize its significance and are able to act on it, given how 
much information there is to sift through. This means sensitive information is doubly 
insulated –first by the mountain of data it lies beneath, and second by the information 
overload of those charged with going through it: overload may work to make analysts 
blind to important information and not register its significance when it is taken in by a 
human consciousness. 
The theory that clear-headed attention rather than loss of control takes away 
privacy fits in with the NSA distinction between collection and inspection. Attention 
is a version of inspection. Until attention or inspection has been achieved, content 
remains unintruded upon. If merely being in a position to inspect was sufficient for 
intrusion, then, incredibly, a person holding but steadfastly refusing to read someone 
else’s private diary would never be able to maintain the privacy of the diary’s 
contents. It makes more sense to say that privacy is intact until attention is trained on 
the diary, and even then someone may miss its significance. 
The distinction between collection and inspection seems compelling in other, 
uncontroversial cases. For example, suppose a university or school examination has 
just ended. The scripts are picked up from each desk and are put in a pile. If collection 
were sufficient for inspection, then piling up the scripts would take someone much 
further toward examining them than is credible. Every school or university teacher 
knows that reading and grading are a much longer (and often more painful) exercise 
than collecting scripts from students. 
Leaving aside the collection/inspection distinction, how revealing would 
identifiers and links between them be if they were able to be inspected? An identifier 
like a telephone number or email address is not uniquely identifying, since it can be 
used by more than one person, and since the official telephone subscriber or email 
account holder may be tied to a false name. Again, email accounts can be used or 
entered illicitly by imposters, even when correct names are used. And of course, 
malware and the use of bots can enslave someone else’s computer, showing it as the 
source of malicious or nuisance email traffic, even though the traffic flows without 
the owner’s knowledge or consent. This means that identifiers can be more loosely 
connected to real people than might be thought. Consequently, the collection and 
linking of identifiers may tell one much less about the referents of the identifiers than 
is assumed. 
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Even when identifiers are as identifying as a name and address in the physical 
world, they are the most minimal contribution to intelligence. After all, the name of 
the occupant at a postal address is often made public by the occupant, for the benefit 
of the postman. So the mere fact that bulk collection starts with and links identifiers 
may be no more problematic than someone making a list of the names of the self-
identified occupants of houses, indicating which occupants live closest to each. This 
information, too, may be freely and publicly available to any observer. In a targeted 
surveillance operation, knowledge of a name and address is a precondition, not a 
result, of surveillance, and would not begin to scratch the surface of a suspect or his 
activities. At the level of discovering and linking identifiers, then, bulk collection is 
no more intrusive than the pre-surveillance stage of many targeted surveillance 
operations.  
It is true that bulk collection may reveal patterns of communication that might 
justify targeted surveillance assisted by highly intrusive technologies such as taps and 
bugs. But bulk collection does not by itself constitute such surveillance or by itself 
involve the associated levels of intrusion. Bulk collection is much more impersonal 
and the results of queries much more general than the recordings of targeted 
surveillance. Bulk collection identifies complex patterns of communication without 
uncovering the content of those communications. It is impersonal, because telephone 
numbers can be chained without disclosing whose numbers they are, or how many 
identifiers correspond to one person or organization. Again, bulk collection produces 
no experience of people identified, still less of zones protected by privacy 
conventions. It is much less intrusive than a secret camera in a bedroom conveying 
images of sex to a human camera operator. 
 
The NSA state and the Stasi state 
 
In an article written in 2013 for the American magazine, The Nation, Tim Shorrock 
writes of being shocked that private industrial companies acting as contractors for the 
NSA should have access to so much communications data of US private citizens. 
Booz Allen was Edward Snowdon’s employer, for example. Shorrock claims: 
 
 …tens of thousands of Americans working for private intelligence contractors 
have access to the personal information of millions of their fellow citizens, 
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including their phone and e-mail communications as well Internet chats on 
Yahoo, Google and other ISPs. Combine this private army of contractors with 
the outlandishly huge federal intelligence bureaucracy, and the term Stasi—
the East German secret police frequently invoked by Bill Binney—doesn’t 
sound like an exaggeration. Except this is state surveillance plus capitalism: 
spying for profit.10 
 
My own view is that comparisons with the Stasi are a gross exaggeration. Shorrock 
trades on Edward Snowdon’s claim that as an individual working for a corporate 
contractor he had access to the emails and other data of many individuals. This is 
similar to the access that an ANPR operator has to location data for a particular driver 
he is personally interested in. This does not make the ANPR system a Stasi-state tool.  
The personal purposes of the rogue operator are neither here nor there when what is at 
issue is how the collection and inspection of data adds to state power –at least if rogue 
users are relatively few and far between. 
In order to be analogous to the Stasi state, the NSA state would have to collect 
data for purposes similar to the Stasi state’s purposes in collecting the information it 
collected. The purpose of the NSA system, when not perverted by rogue operators 
pursuing personal vendettas or personal curiosity, is counter-terrorism. The purpose 
of the Stasi state was the enforcement of a political orthodoxy and the identification 
of individuals who challenged that orthodoxy by behaving in ways that are perfectly 
legal in the West. These are completely different purposes. It is true that the NSA 
apparatus may be unfit for its purpose, as its meager results in prosecutions suggest. 
But this does not lower it to the moral depths of the Stasi state. 
 The disanalogy between the NSA apparatus and the Stasi state does not end 
there. If we concentrate on bulk collection as opposed to de-encryption and cable-
splitting, it becomes very clear that the Stasi state characteristically depended on 
highly personal reporting by paid collaborators reporting on work colleagues, family 
members and friends. From 1960 to 1989 the East German government enlisted 
between 250,000 and 500,000 people as informants.11 These people would have had, 
and communicated to the government, a lot of contextualized knowledge of 
surveillance targets—hugely intrusive information that the state would otherwise have 
had to reconstruct.  
 15 
East German civil society, such as it was, was contaminated for at least 30 
years by a pervasive system of spying that was very personal and highly vulnerable to 
spiteful or malicious reporting. Worse, the content of the information provided was 
itself highly personal, a kind of systematized gossip, but with damaging consequences 
for people gossiped about if they showed an interest in or sympathy with West 
Germany, Western Europe or the United States.  
Bulk collection is far more impersonal. First, it is aimed at the disclosure of 
links with suspects who can then be eliminated. The designation of a suspect as a seed 
or target is evidence-based. It is officially expected that lots of links with seeds or 
targets are completely innocent (hence the metaphor of the needle in the haystack), 
and for the time that bulk collection was legal, there were court-imposed constraints 
on whose telephone data could be investigated, how indirect communications links 
could be, and how long the data could be held. The fact that ISIL-related arrests of all 
kinds in 2014-2015 amounted to under 70, and that these were not just based on NSA 
data, suggests that the US is far less willing to act on bulk collection than East 
Germany was willing to act on any intelligence, even malicious intelligence. And 
since life out of detention in East Germany was much more grim than pre-arrest life in 
the US, the comparison between the two regimes does not stand up to inspection. 
 Again, bulk collection is a big data exercise. Its point is to represent huge 
numbers of communications as networks of contacts. As already pointed out, the 
results of network analysis are not by themselves very informative, but can indicate 
focal points for further investigations, perhaps with a view eventually to a pattern of 
targeted surveillance that really will provide the details of a planned attack or key 
players in financing terrorist groups. 
 
What really is wrong with bulk collection 
 
Bulk collection can be objectionable even if it is relatively unintrusive. It can be 
objectionable because (i) its use over a long time succeeds in identifying few 
terrorists; (ii) its use of discriminants reflect stereotyping or is too sweeping; (iii) the 
number of hops it allows from direct communications with evidenced-based suspects 
potentially makes too many others persons of interest; (iv) it is hard to regulate 
legally; and (v) it is hard for democratic legislative bodies to hold those in charge of it 
accountable under those laws that do exist. 
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Bulk collection either satisfies each of these conditions or risks doing so. The 
connection with (i) has already been made: very few arrests have been made on the 
basis of bulk collection or human intelligence. To touch on (ii), discriminants can be 
too broad, at least in the first instance. (iii) is a related difficulty: if communication 
links can be very indirect, many people with no connection to terrorists but who have 
communicated with numbers also communicated with by terrorists, can be put under 
suspicion. 
 For example, a search of all phone conversations from a certain American area 
code to Pakistan or Somalia or Yemen in a given week or month may be too sweeping 
to yield proper targets for bulk collection, because US citizens have family in these 
countries and may be communicating with them for reasons completely unconnected 
to terrorism. Just as communicating with Yemen or Pakistan may be entirely 
innocent, so may being the next door neighbor of the two people guilty of the mass 
shooting in San Bernadino. So police or intelligence services need a reason for casting 
the net wide, and they need to identify relatively low thresholds for being of no 
interest for people caught in that net. Otherwise, being from Yemen or living next to a 
terrorist, or calling a number a terrorist also calls, is sufficient –objectionably 
sufficient-- for being of interest to the authorities, in which case police suspicion is 
distributed according to unfair and discriminatory criteria. This may have occurred in 
the single conviction by 2015 of someone in the US on the basis of bulk collection.12  
Targeting people for the use of encryption may be similarly discriminatory. 
WhatsApp is protected by encryption, for example, but millions of its users don’t 
know or don’t care about that, choosing it for communications because it is free of 
charge, even internationally. 
The fact that there have been very few ISIL-related arrests in the US, and still 
fewer on the basis of bulk collection, suggests that however rough and ready 
discriminants are at the stage at which they are authorized for application to collected 
data, the results of their application—namely the revelation of a set of linked 
identifiers—is far from triggering the detention of anyone associated with those 
identifiers.  It may not even trigger any sort of targeted surveillance involving 
communications content associated with those identifiers. This is where one of the 
differences from the Stasi state is highlighted. In the Stasi-case, there was a very low 
threshold for being of interest and many more opportunities for informants to allege 
links with subversives when no such links existed. On the other hand, there was a 
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very high threshold in the Stasi case for being considered of no further interest if an 
informant found someone a convenient target. In the NSA case, communications links 
are neither simply alleged, and nor is their existence considered incriminating by 
itself. The terrorist who orders lots of pizzas by telephone does not throw undue 
suspicion on a pizza parlour that everyone else telephones. 
 Let us define the NSA-state as the US government and law enforcement 
agencies informed by NSA analysis of data. Then there is a straightforward way of 
distinguishing the Stasi state from the NSA-state, and that is by reference to Philip 
Pettit’s refinement of Isaiah Berlin’s concept of negative political liberty.13 Negative 
political liberty is a matter of not being impeded by authorities in acting on one’s 
choices. But even in slave societies it can happen that people get to act on their own 
choices, say because a particular slave-owner is benign, or so preoccupied by other 
matters that he cannot spare the time to make slaves act on his choices. This is 
negative liberty by neglect --not genuine liberty-- since the prevailing power structure 
permits the slave-owner to behave oppressively whenever he likes.  
 Philip Pettit has coined the term ‘domination’ for this sort of case, i.e. where 
an agent in a power structure does not actually interfere with the choices of a local 
agent, but has the authority or ability to interfere.   More specifically, A dominates B 
when: 
 A can interfere, 
 with impunity, 
 in certain choices that B makes,  
where what counts as interference is broad: it could be actual physical restraint, 
or direct, coercive threats, but might also consist in subtler forms of 
manipulation.14 
 In the NSA-state with bulk collection there is at the very least a risk of arrest if 
location or communications data happens to link a US citizen with a terrorist. If all 
that prevents this happening is information overload or bad publicity after the 
Snowdon revelations, then the NSA-state might be said to dominate, even if it does 
not actually interfere with the choices of, the would-be suspects thrown up by the bulk 
collection process.  
 The people dominated by the NSA-state are a tiny fraction of the American 
population, the rest of whom enjoy not only negative liberty but non-domination from 
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the NSA-state. The Stasi-state, on the other hand, took away the (negative) liberty of 
all of those it removed from employment or put in prison on the basis of informants’ 
reports. It drastically reduced the negative liberty of everyone intimidated into not 
reading Western literature and prevented from travelling to the West or associating 
with Westerners. It drastically reduced negative liberty by limiting what people could 
legally say in public. Again, even where no negative liberty was directly taken away, 
the Stasi-state can plausibly be said to have dominated everyone in East Germany, 
even those in its ruling party, since not even party members were safe from suspicion 
of treachery or departures from orthodoxy. In short, East Germany is plausibly said to 
be the agent of total “domination” in Pettit’s sense -- in a way the NSA-state cannot 
plausibly be said to be. More importantly, the Stasi-state is much more obviously 




Secrecy and the Tension with Democracy15 
 
Democratic control of the use of mass telecommunications monitoring seems to be in 
tension with secrecy.  Secrecy is difficult to reconcile with democratic control 
because activity of which a would-be controller is ignorant cannot be controlled by 
that agent.  But much of the most invasive surveillance has to be carried out covertly 
if it is to be effective. If targeted surveillance like the use of audio bugging or phone 
tapping equipment is to be effective, the subjects of the surveillance cannot know it is 
going on. I accept the need for operational secrecy in relation to particular, targeted 
uses of surveillance.  Getting access to private spaces being used to plan serious crime 
through the use of bugs or phone taps can only be effective if it is done covertly.  This 
has a (reatively slight) cost in transparency, but the accountability required by 
democratic principle is still possible.  
There is an important distinction, however, between norms of operational 
secrecy and norms of programme secrecy.  For example, it is consistent with 
operational secrecy for some operational details to be made public, after the event. It 
is also possible for democratically elected and security-cleared representatives to be 
briefed in advance about an operation.  
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A key body in the US that ought to be well placed to conduct effective 
oversight is the Senate Intelligence Committee.  This 15 member congressional body 
was established in the 1970s in the aftermath of another scandal caused by revelations 
of the NSA’s and CIA’s spying activities, including project SHAMROCK, a 
programme for intercepting telegraphic communications leaving or entering the 
United States.16. The Committee was set up after the Frank Church Committee 
investigations, also setting up the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.  Its mission 
is to conduct ‘vigilant legislative oversight’ of America’s intelligence gathering 
agencies.   
 Membership of this committee is temporary and rotated.  Eight of the 15 
senators are majority and minority members on other relevant committees – 
Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Judiciary – and the other 
seven are made up of another four members of the majority and three of the minority. 
In principle this body should be well equipped to resolve the tension between the 
needs of security and the requirements of democracy.  First, the fact that its 
membership is drawn from elected senators and that it contains representatives of 
both parties means that these men and women have a very strong claim to legitimacy.  
Senators have a stronger claim to representativeness than many MPs, because the 
party system in the US is so much more decentralized than that in the UK. 
Congressional committees in general have far more resources to draw upon 
than their counterparts in the UK Parliament.  They have formal powers to subpoena 
witnesses and call members of the executive to account for themselves.  They are also 
far better resourced financially, and are able to employ teams of lawyers to scrutinize 
legislation or reports.  However, the record of American congressional oversight of 
the NSA has been disappointing.  And a large part of the explanation can be found in 
the secrecy of the programme, achieved through a combination of security 
classification and outright deception.  Leaving aside the active efforts that have been 
made by intelligence services to resist oversight, it is also important to consider some 
of the constraints that interfere with the senators serving on this committee 
succeeding in the role. 
The act of holding members of an agency to account is a skilled enterprise, 
and one that requires detailed understanding of how that agency operates.   The 
potency of Congressional oversight to a large extent resides in the incisiveness of the 
questions it is able to ask, based on expertise in the areas they are overseeing.  Where 
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is this expertise to come from?  Amy Zegart17 lists three different sources: first, the 
already existing knowledge that the senator brings to the role from their previous 
work; second, directly learning on the job; and third, making use of bodies such as the 
Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office or 
Congressional Research Service.  However, she goes on to point out forces that weigh 
against all three of these sources of knowledge when it comes to the world of 
intelligence.   
 First, consider the likelihood of any particular senator having detailed 
knowledge of the workings of the intelligence services unaided.  Senators seeking 
election benefit enormously from a detailed working knowledge of whatever 
industries are important to the senator’s home district – these are the issues which are 
important to their voters, and the issues on which they are most inclined to select their 
preferred candidate.  Homegrown knowledge from direct intelligence experience is 
highly unusual, as contrasted, for example, with experience of the armed services, so 
while nearly a third of the members of the armed services committee have direct 
experience of the military, only 2 members out of 535 Congressmen in the 111th 
congress had direct experience of an intelligence service. 
Second, can Congressmen acquiring the relevant knowledge while on the job? 
Senators have a range of competing concerns, potential areas where they could pursue 
legislative improvement: why would they choose intelligence?  Certainly they are 
unlikely to be rewarded for gaining such knowledge by their voters: intelligence 
policy ranks low on the lists of the priorities of voters, who are far more moved by 
local, domestic concerns.  And learning the technical detail of the intelligence 
services is extremely time consuming: Zegart quotes former Senate Intelligence 
Committee chairman Bob Graham’s estimate that ‘learning the basics’ usually takes 
up half of a member’s eight-year term on the intelligence committee.  Zegart also 
argues that interest groups in this area are much weaker than those in domestic policy, 
though she argues for this by categorising intelligence oversight as foreign rather than 
domestic policy.  On this basis she points to the Encyclopedia of Associations listing 
of a mere 1,101 interest groups concerned with foreign policy out of 25,189 interest 
groups listed in total.   
Again, voters who do have a strong concern with intelligence or foreign policy 
are likely to be dispersed over a wide area, because it is a national issue, whereas 
voters concerned overwhelmingly with particular domestic policies, like agriculture, 
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for example, are likely to be clustered in a particular area.  Term limits compound the 
limitation in the ability of senators to build up expertise, but are the only way to fairly 
share out an unattractive duty with little use for reelection, so most senators spend less 
than four years on the committee, and the longest serving member had served for 
twelve years, as opposed to the 30 years of the Armed Services Committee.  Add to 
all of that the effect of secrecy, which means the initial basis on which any expertise 
could be built is likely to be meagre.  Secrecy also means that any actual good results 
which a senator might parade before an electorate are unlikely to be publicisable – 
although large amounts of public spending may be involved – estimated at $1.5 
billion.  A senator from Utah could hardly boast of the building of the NSA data 
storage centre at camp Bluffdale in the way he might boast about the building of a 
bridge. 
Secrecy also undermines one of the key weapons at Congress’s disposal – 
control over the purse strings.  Congressional committees divide the labour of 
oversight between authorization committees which engage in oversight of policy, and 
12 House and Senate appropriations committees, which develop fiscal expertise to 
prevent uncontrolled government spending.  This system, although compromised by 
the sophistication of professionalised lobbying, largely works as intended in the 
domestic arena, with authorisations committees able to effectively criticize 
programmes – publically – as offering poor value for money, and appropriations 
committees able to defund them. 
In the world of Intelligence, on the other hand, secrecy diminishes the power 
of controlling spending.  For a start, budget information is largely classified.  For 
decades the executive would make no information available at all.  Often only the top 
line figure on a programme’s spending is declassified.  Gaining access even to this 
information is challenging, as members of the intelligence authorisations and defense 
appropriations subcommittees can view these figures -- but only on site at a secure 
location – so that only about 50% actually do.  The secrecy of the programmes and 
their cost makes it much harder for Congressmen to resist the will of the executive – 
the objections of one committee are not common knowledge in the way that the 
objections of the Agriculture committee would be. 
The fact that so much of the detail of the programmes that members of the 
Intelligence Committee are voting on remains classified severely undermines the 
meaningfulness of their consent on behalf of the public.  Take for example the 2008 
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vote taken by the Committee on the FISA amendments Act.  This legislation curtailed 
the role of FISA itself.  It reduced the requirement for FISA approval to the over-all 
system being used by the NSA, rather than needing to approve surveillance on a target 
by target basis.  This Act also created the basis for the monitoring of phone and 
Internet content.  However, very few of the Senators on the Committee had been fully 
briefed about the operation of the warrantless wiretapping programme, a point 
emphasized by Senator Feingold, one of the few who had been briefed.  The other 
Senators would regret passing this legislation in the future, as information about the 
NSA’s activities were declassified, he insisted.  Whether or not he proves to be 
correct, it seems democratically unacceptable that pertinent information could remain 
inaccessible to the Senators charged with providing democratic oversight.  The 
reasons for keeping the details of surveillance programmes secret from the public 
simply do not apply to Senators.  Classification of information with the effect of 
blocking access by members of the Senate Intelligence Committee in particular seems 
unjustified if not simply perverse. This suggests the topic of a sequel to the current 
paper: the use of the classification system to impede oversight of national security.18  
 
  
                                                        
1 For much more on what makes a crime serious, see my ‘The Scope of Serious Crime 
and Preventive Policing’, Tom Sorell, Criminal Justice Ethics 35 (2016): 163-82 
2 Tom Sorell, “Preventive Policing and European Counter-Terrorism.” Criminal 
Justice Ethics 30 1 (2011):1-22 
3  John Guelke and Tom Sorell, “Violations of Privacy’ and Law: the case of 
Stalking” Law Ethics and Philosophy (2017). John Guelke and Tom Sorell,  “Liberal 
Democratic Regulation and Technological Advance” in The Oxford Handbook in 
Law, Regulation and Technology, ed. Roger  
Brownsword, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
4 Maybe there is something wrong with distaste full stop, whether ostracising or not. 
See Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law. 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
5 Thomas Nagel, “Concealment and Exposure” in Concealment and Exposure and 
Other Essays. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 3-26. 
 23 
                                                                                                                                                              
6 John Guelke and Tom Sorell, “Violations of Privacy’ and Law: the case of Stalking” 
Law Ethics and Philosophy (2017). 
7 Glenn Greenwald, “NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers 
daily.” Guardian, June 2013 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order. How “How the NSA is Tracking People Right 
Now”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/world/how-
the-nsa-is-tracking-people-right-now/634/ 
8 Office of Intelligence and Analysis, “Analysis of ISIL-related arrests in the 
homeland from January 2014-September 2015” Unclassified Homeland Security 
document https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2515184/isil-related-arrests-
in-homeland-from-jan2014.pdf 
9 David Anderson, A Question Of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review. 
(London: HMSO, 2015): 7.25 
10 Tim Shorrock,  “A Modern-Day Stasi State” The Nation, June 11 2013, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/modern-day-stasi-state/ 
11 For an account of the Stasi in the context of the collapse of the German Democratic 
Republic, see Edward N. Peterson, The Secret Police and the Revolution. Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. 
12 This may have happened to a San Diego resident of Somali origin called Basaaly 
Moalin, on the basis of records of money transfers whose beneficiaries  were 
controversially thought to be terrorists: See the New Yorker article on his case: 
Mattathias Schwartz, “The Whole Haystack”, The New Yorker, January 26, 2016. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack 
13 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty, Isaiah Berlin, 
London: Oxford University Press 2002.  
14 Phillip Pettit, 1996.  ‘Freedom as Antipower’ Ethics 106 3 (1996): 576-604 
15 This section is adapted with significant revisions from John Guelke and Tom 
Sorell,  “Liberal Democratic Regulation and Technological Advance” in The Oxford 
Handbook in Law, Regulation and Technology, ed. Roger Brownsword, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017) 
16 James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Agency, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1982.  
 24 
                                                                                                                                                              
17 Amy Zegart, “The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight,” Political 
Science Quarterly 126 1 (2011): 1–25.  
18 This is the message of someone with decades of experience in the US government 
of  applying norms of secrecy.  See J. William Leonard, “The Corrupting Influence of 
Secrecy on National Policy Decisions” in Government Secrecy, ed. S Maret and T 
Youn (Bingley: Emerald Publishing, 2011): 421-434. See also Sen Ron Wyden’s 
comment on secrecy upon the reception of the 2012 report on the CIA interrogation 
Senate Committee on Intelligence, “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 










David Anderson, A Question Of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review. 
London: HMSO, 2015. https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/IPR-Report-Web-Accessible1.pdf 
 
James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Agency, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1982. 
 
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty, Isaiah Berlin, 
London: Oxford University Press 2002. 
 
Glenn Greenwald, “NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers 




                                                                                                                                                              
John Guelke and Tom Sorell,  “Liberal Democratic Regulation and Technological 
Advance” in The Oxford Handbook in Law, Regulation and Technology, ed. Roger  
Brownsword, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 
 
John Guelke and Tom Sorell, “Violations of Privacy’ and Law: the case of Stalking” 









J. William Leonard, “The Corrupting Influence of Secrecy on National Policy 
Decisions” in Government Secrecy, ed. S Maret and T Youn (Bingley: Emerald 
Publishing, 2011): 421-434. 
 
Thomas Nagel, “Concealment and Exposure” in Concealment and Exposure and 
Other Essays. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 3-26. 
 
Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law. Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, “Analysis of ISIL-related arrests in the homeland 




Edward N. Peterson, The Secret Police and the Revolution. Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 2001. 
 
Phillip Pettit, 1996.  ‘Freedom as Antipower’ Ethics 106 3 (1996): 576-604 
 26 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
Mattathias Schwartz, “The Whole Haystack”, The New Yorker, January 26, 2016. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack 
Senate Committee on Intelligence, “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Senator Wyden Additional Views” 
www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/press/wyden.pdf# 
 
Tim Shorrock,  “A Modern-Day Stasi State” The Nation, June 11 2013, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/modern-day-stasi-state/ 
 
Tom Sorell, “Preventive Policing and European Counter-Terrorism.” Criminal Justice 
Ethics 30 1 (2011):1-22 
 
Tom Sorell, “The Scope of Serious Crime and Preventive Policing.” Criminal Justice 
Ethics 35 (2016): 163-82 
 
Amy Zegart, “The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight,” Political 
Science Quarterly 126 1 (2011): 1–25. 
  
